The Specter of Disintegration: How the Baltic Experience and Possible (De)Occupation of Kursk Oblast Could Change the Fate of Russian Regions

Historical examples, such as the Baltic states gaining independence in1918, demonstrate that in times of crisis and weakened central power, regions may seek autonomy. Statements by Ilya Ponomarev and Marat Gelman about the possibility of creating alternative governing bodies within "Muscovy"suggest a potential scenario where temporarily occupied Russian regions might begin to explore ways to break free from Moscow's control. This could lead to the decolonization of the last colonial empire in Europe, reminiscent of theSoviet Union's collapse in the early 1990s. 

Border regions like Ingria, the Baltic Republic (the so-called"Kaliningrad Oblast"), Pskov Oblast, and Karelia could become the next conflict zones. If the central government fails to provide stability and security, these regions, colonized by Moscow, could face the threat of military actions and external interference. The example of the Baltic states, which gained independence in 1918, might inspire Russian regions to seek their own path. History shows that smaller states are often better equipped to handle the challenges of war and crisis. Regional independence might become a strategy to avoid the economic and social collapse that could accompany the Kremlin's downfall.

Therefore, the possible (de)occupation of the Kursk Oblast by the ArmedForces of Ukraine could be a turning point not only for this region but for all of Russia. In the context of geopolitical instability and increasing international pressure, such events could trigger a chain reaction in other border regions. This is particularly relevant given Moscow's ongoing at tempts to escalate the conflict with Ukraine and expand it beyond Ukrainian territory, which could lead to NATO's involvement in the war.

One of the first signs of this possibility was a statement by Ilya Ponomarev, who suggested that Ukrainian authorities take the lead in establishing alternative governing bodies in the Kursk region. This statements parked considerable attention as it raised the issue of the political agency of Russian opposition forces, which had previously not been recognized on the international stage. If alternative governance structures are established in a region under the control of Ukrainian forces, the so-called 'Russian opposition' could position itself as a legitimate political force not only within Russia but also internationally.

However, this approach is not very effective. While it might generate significant media attention, its impact would likely be short-lived. Instead, more focus should be placed on the historical experience of the Baltic states –Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – which successfully gained independence after the collapse of the Russian Empire. These examples demonstrate how, even under conditions of 'external (de)occupation', it is possible to lay strong foundations for an independent state. This experience could become appealing to other (currently) Russian regions, such as the temporarily occupied Ingria, Amber Land (Baltic Republic), Pskov, Smolensk, Komi, Russian Pomorye, Novgorod, Kuban, Don, and Karelia, which might see the events in the Kursk Oblast as a'window of opportunity' to change their own status.

If the Kursk Oblast (or even part of it) is liberated by Ukraine, it could become the first Russian region where active efforts to establish alternative governance structures begin. This could inspire similar movements in other regions, particularly those with strong ties to neighboring countries and significant external influence. The experience of the Baltic states shows that even after long years of occupation and subjugation to an external power, it is possible to revive and strengthen national identity and political independence.

A crucial factor in this situation is historical memory and the population's willingness to fight for their rights and independence.Lithuania's experience demonstrates that the prohibitions and restrictions imposed by an occupying power can only intensify the desire for independence and the strengthening of national identity.

Thus, the potential (de)occupation of the Kursk Oblast by Ukrainian forces could become a catalyst for changes that would affect not only this region but also other parts of the so-called 'Russian Federation.' Historical parallels with the events in the Baltics and the possibility of establishing alternative governance structures raise questions about the future of Moscow's influence amid growing internal and external pressures.

In recent years, the leadership in Moscow has shown a clear reluctance to acknowledge the dangerous trends threatening the country's stability. The governance system is becoming increasingly destabilized, yet the Kremlin continues to maintain a facade of control. This has been particularly evident after the loss of part of the Kursk Oblast, where Putin's and the security forces' response was notably lackluster and lacked decisive solutions.

Instead of taking bold actions, the 'president' adheres to familiar routines: public visits to factories and meetings with 'loyal allies' like Ramzan Kadyrov. These events create an illusion of calm and stability, while the actual situation in the country is slipping out of control.

Initially, the Kremlin sought to push chaos beyond Russia's borders by creating buffer zones. However, the war with Ukraine, which did not go as planned, has brought this chaos back into the country. Now, Russia is experiencing regular drone attacks, explosions at military facilities, and the presence of foreign troops in the Kursk Oblast.

The country's security is also under threat due to the rise in crime and the activities of terrorist groups like ISIS. The question of maintainingRussia's territorial integrity is becoming increasingly urgent. Amidst this crisis, there is a glaring absence of crisis management, and instead of analyzing the situation, officials only display personal loyalty to Putin.

It appears the Kremlin is willing to sacrifice regions like the Kursk Oblast to delay making unpopular decisions, such as a general mobilization. However, the fate of the border regions could foreshadow the fate of all Russian regions if the central authority faces a collapse.

It's clear that under these circumstances, it's time to consider the survival of the regions. What’s needed are leaders capable of not only leading protests but also governing these regions as independent states in the post-Russian space, to counter the chaos and ensure peace and development.Corrupt and cowardly local officials, Kremlin's appointees, no longer inspire trust (if they ever did), as they reassure the population that "everything is under control" while explosions and fires occur across the country. 

The so-called "Russian Federation" is facing a severe crisis, and regions must seek paths to independence to avoid plunging into economic and social ruin alongside the Kremlin. In today’s world, territorial integrity is no longer the primary factor for development. Regional independence could be away to overcome Russia's "geographic curse" and start developing in the interest of the people living in these lands. 

Developing a digital economy, establishing financial and logistics hubs, and improving social infrastructure could lead to the prosperity of regions as independent states. In a reality where war and chaos have become part and parcel of Russian life, regional independence might be the only solution.

Putin and his inner circle continue to insist on pursuing war and isolation, ignoring the obvious signs of crisis. However, the war has already reached Russian territory, and combined with the security crisis and the threat of economic collapse, this could lead to the fragmentation of Russia.

The so-called "Russian Federation" is likely to repeat the fate of the Russian Empire, which collapsed due to World War I. The specter of a "civil war" is already looming, especially with the loss of theKursk Oblast. Russian "society" is now directly facing the consequences of military actions – air raids, explosions, and evacuations – while the government remains indifferent.

Moscow asserts that there is no alternative to the Empire. But in times of war and escalating violence, it is the Empire that is least capable of handling these challenges. The experience of Finland and the Baltic states, which declared independence in 1918, shows that smaller, more compact states are better at managing crises and quicker to return to normalcy.

This experience could also be valuable for Russian regions. The modernworld favors the development of compact states that are more resilient toupheavals and can provide stability and security to their citizens.

Compact states do not initiate large-scale wars. In such countries, itis easier to establish social and political consensus, as well as build connections with the international community. The principle of power turnover in these states is inviolable, whereas in Russia, an entire generation has been born and lives under Putin, and risks being consumed by war during his reign.